



# **Combustible Dust – Understanding Hazard Analysis, Mitigation, and the Current Industry Standard of Care**



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# Presentation Agenda

## Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

- Review lost history and fundamentals of fire, flash fire, and explosion hazards

## Current Regulatory Framework

- Present current and upcoming code requirements and NFPA standards

-----Break-----

## Dust Hazard Analysis (DHA)

- Introduce DHAs and discuss what must be included
- DHA examples and case studies

-----Break-----

## Hazard Management

- Discuss methods for prevention and mitigation

## Questions and Interactive Discussion

# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

What industries generate and handle combustible dust?




# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

What's the risk? A review of loss history.

## Explosion in a flour warehouse, Turin Italy, 1785

- Early documented combustible dust explosion
- Long period of dry weather
- Worker shoveling flour to chamber below warehouse
- Large volume of flour fell and was ignited by lamp
- Secondary explosion occurred in warehouse causing bakery windows to blow out
- Owner of bakery familiar with similar incidents






# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

What's the risk? A review of loss history.

## Imperial Sugar, Georgia, 2008

- Killed 14 workers and injured 36 others
- Fire explosion occurred in an enclosed conveyor located beneath sugar silos
  - Likely due to overheated bearing
- Primary explosion dislodged dust that had accumulated on surfaces causing secondary explosions throughout the complex





# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

What's the risk? A review of loss history.

## New Taipei Water Park Deflagration, Taiwan, 2015

- Colored corn starch sprayed into the crowd using blowers and compressed air canisters
- Dust cloud ignited near stage, possibly from lighting or smoking materials
- Aftermath resulted in 15 deaths and 496 injuries



FIRE & RISK  
★ ★ ALLIANCE ★ ★

# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

What's the risk? A review of loss history.

## Didion Milling Company Explosion and Fire, Wisconsin, 2017


- Explosion occurred in dry corn milling facility
- Primary explosion likely originated in milling equipment and was followed by several secondary explosions
- Five fatalities and 14 injuries






# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

What's the risk? A review of loss history.



Dust explosion incidents documented by the CSB between 1980 and 2005: *Methods in Chemical Process Safety – Volume 3 Dust Explosions*


Reported dust explosions from 1785 to 2012 from: *Methods in Chemical Process Safety – Volume 3 Dust Explosions*




# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## What's the risk? A review of loss history.

Incidents By Industry




Incidents By Material



Breakdown of dust explosion incidents between 1980 and 2005:  
*Methods in Chemical Process Safety – Volume 3 Dust Explosions*

# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

What's the risk? A review of loss history.



Breakdown of equipment involved in dust explosions from 1983 and 2006: FM Data Sheet 7-76, "Table 6. Losses by Equipment Type," *FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets*, Factory Mutual Insurance Company, January 2012, pg. 38.



# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Conditions Necessary for an Explosion

### Combustible dust (fuel)

- Finely divided combustible particulate that propagates a deflagration

### Oxygen

- Present in air

### Dispersion


- Dust dispersed in air above in sufficient concentration

### Ignition Source


- Ignition source has enough energy to ignite dust

### Confinement

- Compartment / vessel ruptures due to overpressure




Explosion Pentagon



# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Dust Fire

Titanium dust, ¼ inch thick



MDF wood fiber, ¼ inch thick





# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Dust Deflagration (Flash Fire)





# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Dust Explosion



# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Combustible Particulate Solids (CPS)

- Any combustible solid material composed of distinct particles or pieces regardless of size, shape, or chemical composition
  - Dusts, fines, fibers, flakes, chips, chunks, or mixtures of these
- Whenever CPS are produced, processed, handled, or conveyed, fine particles will break off
- All CPS should be expected to contain some amount of combustible dust
  - Fines generally do not remain mixed with course particulate



# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Particulate Size

Rate of combustion depends on particle size


- Distribution of particle size, particle morphology

When the average particle size is small enough, flame propagation can occur


- Traditionally defined as 420 microns or smaller (US No. 40 standard sieve)
- Ordinary granulated sugar is 75% sub 420 micron

New definitions focus on testing versus particle size alone


- Dust determined to be explosible / deflagrable via testing
- Median particle size of 500 microns or higher may be explosible in some cases




(a)




(b)




(c)



(d)



(e)



(f)



# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Standardized Dust Testing

*Table 1: Dust explosibility parameters.*

| Parameter          | Apparatus                 | Description  | Test method |
|--------------------|---------------------------|--|-------------|
| $P_{\max}$         | 20-L Siwek                | Maximum explosion pressure in a constant-volume explosion  | ASTM E1226  |
| $(dP / dt)_{\max}$ | 20-L Siwek                | Maximum rate of pressure rise in a constant-volume deflagration                                  | ASTM E1226  |
| $K_{St}$           | 20-L Siwek                | Volume-normalized (standardized) maximum rate of pressure rise in a constant-volume deflagration | ASTM E1226  |
| MEC                | 20-L Siwek                | Minimum explosible (or explosive) dust concentration   | ASTM E1515  |
| MIE                | Modified Hartmann         | Minimum ignition energy of a dust cloud (electric spark)   | ASTM E2019  |
| MIT                | Godbert-Greenwald furnace | Minimum ignition temperature of a dust cloud   | ASTM E1491  |
| LIT                | Hot plate                 | Minimum ignition temperature of a dust layer or dust deposit                                     | ASTM E2021  |
| LOC                | 20-L Siwek                | Limiting oxygen concentration in the atmosphere for flame propagation in a dust cloud            | ASTM E2931  |
| Volume resistivity | Charge decay test unit    | DC resistance or conductance of insulating materials   | ASTM D257   |

# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Standardized Dust Testing


| Parameter  | Description (unit)                                   | Typical Application   |
|------------|--|---|
| $P_{\max}$ | Maximum explosion pressure (bar)                     | Design of explosion protection systems and consequence analysis. $K_{St} > 0$ indicates a potential flash fire and/or explosion hazard. <sup>1</sup>  |
| $K_{St}$   | Deflagration index (bar-m/s)                         |   |
| MEC        | Minimum explosible concentration (g/m <sup>3</sup> ) | Dust hazard analysis and forensic analysis of flash fires and explosions.   |
| MIE        | Minimum ignition energy (mJ)                         | Measure of ignition sensitivity most relevant to electrostatic discharge and other types of sparks.   |
| MIT        | Minimum dust cloud ignition temperature              | Measure of ignition sensitivity most relevant to large heated surfaces, elevated process temperatures, and mechanical sparks. Also applied to determine thresholds for equipment temperatures in hazardous areas. |
| LIT        | Dust layer ignition temperature                      | Evaluating surface temperature limits to prevent dust layer ignition. Applied to determine thresholds for equipment temperatures in hazardous areas.  |
| SIT        | Self-ignition temperature                            | Evaluating the propensity for self-heating leading to spontaneous ignition. Applied for evaluation of bulk storage enclosures.  |

<sup>1</sup>. Testing low  $K_{St} / P_{\max}$  dusts in the cubic meter apparatus may indicate dusts are non-explosible.

# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Standardized Dust Testing

Example properties taken from GESTIS Database: <https://staubex.ifa.dguv.de/explosuche.aspx?lang=e>






# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Standardized Dust Testing

Example properties taken from GESTIS Database: <https://staubex.ifa.dguv.de/explosuche.aspx?lang=e>



# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Example Dust Testing Results

Table 1: Summary of explosibility screening test results.

| Sample      | Moisture content<br>(wt.%) | Concentration<br>(g/m <sup>3</sup> ) | Explosible |
|-------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------|
| Corn starch | 5.30                       | 1000                                 | Yes        |

Table 2: Summary of dust explosibility parameters.

| Sample      | Explosion severity    |                             |                         | Ignition sensitivity       |             |                          |
|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|
|             | $P_{\max}$<br>(bar g) | $(dP/dt)_{\max}$<br>(bar/s) | $K_{St}$<br>(bar · m/s) | MEC<br>(g/m <sup>3</sup> ) | MIT<br>(°C) | MIE <sup>a</sup><br>(mJ) |
| Corn starch | 8.4                   | 459                         | 125                     | 60                         | 300         | 300 – 500                |

Notes


(a) MIE testing was performed without inductance.

# Fundamentals of Combustible Dust

## Example Dust Testing Results

Table 3: Dust sample particle size analyses.

| Dust sample | Median diameter<br>( $\mu\text{m}$ ) | Sauter mean<br>diameter, $d_{32}$<br>( $\mu\text{m}$ ) | % Particle<br>distribution<br>< 75 $\mu\text{m}$ |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| Corn starch | 16.5                                 | 10.6   | 100.0  |




# Regulations and Standards



# Regulations and Standards

## Regulatory Framework



# Regulations and Standards

## NFPA Combustible Dust Standards

| Standard | Industry / Commodity  | Current Edition | Scope   |
|----------|---|-----------------|---|
| 652      | All combustible dust producing facilities   | 2019            | Fundamentals for identifying and managing hazards   |
| 61       | Agricultural and food facilities  | 2020            | Identifying and managing industry or commodity specific combustible dust hazards. Some standards (e.g., NFPA 484 and 664) address fire hazards associated with other industry-specific processes. |
| 484      | Combustible metals  | 2019            |   |
| 654      | Dusts not covered by other standards (e.g., paper, plastics, chemicals, pharmaceutical) | 2020            |   |
| 655      | Sulphur   | 2017            |   |
| 664      | Woodworking and forest products   | 2020            |   |
| 68       | All industries  | 2018            | Explosion venting   |
| 69       | All industries  | 2019            | Explosion prevention and explosion isolation  |
| 70       | All industries  | 2020            | Article 500 addresses requirements for hazardous (classified) areas   |

# Regulations and Standards

## NFPA Combustible Dust Standards

| Standard | Industry / Commodity | Current Edition | Scope  |
|----------|----------------------|-----------------|--|
| 505      | All industries       | 2018            | Standard for powered industrial trucks in hazardous (classified) areas                                   |
| 2112     | All industries       | 2018            | Performance requirements for flame-resistant garments  |
| 2113     | All industries       | 2020            | Selection, care, and use of flame-resistant garments   |
| 77       | All industries       | 2019            | Recommended practice on identifying and managing electrostatic ignition hazards                          |
| 499      | All industries       | 2017            | Recommended practice for the classification of combustible dusts and of hazardous (classified) locations |



# Regulations and Standards

## NFPA Combustible Dust Standards

NFPA combustible dust standards are rapidly changing

- Considerable efforts in recent editions to align with NFPA 652
- All commodity-specific standards now include retroactive DHA requirement
- Standards assign “deadline” of September 7, 2020 to complete DHAs

Many requirements are retroactive

- DHA and hazard management plan
- Ignition source control
- Management systems (e.g. housekeeping, Management of Change, etc.)

Upcoming changes to future editions

- Merging NFPA 652 and commodity-specific standards
- NFPA 660 will be new, all-encompassing combustible dust standard



# Regulations and Standards

## OSHA National Emphasis Program on Combustible Dust

Directive CPL 03-00-008 issued on March 11, 2008

- Issued following Imperial Sugar explosion
- Increase inspection and enforcement activities
- Applies NFPA combustible dust standards as industry standard of care
  - Most recent editions can be enforced

Citations issued in several ways:

- General Duty Clause
- 29 CFR 1910.272 (grain handling facilities)
- 29 CFR 1910.22 (housekeeping)
- 29 CFR 1910.307 (hazardous (classified) areas)



# Regulations and Standards

## International Fire Code

### 2015 and prior editions

- Chapter 22 – Combustible Dust-Producing Operations
  - General requirements for controlling ignition sources and housekeeping
  - Fire code official *is authorized* to enforce applicable provisions of referenced NFPA standards

### 2018 Edition

- Chapter 22 – Combustible Dust-Producing Operations
  - Owner responsible for compliance with the IFC and NFPA 62
  - NFPA 652 applies to new and existing facilities and operations
  - Existing facilities *shall* have a DHA completed within 3 years of the adoption of the 2018 code
  - Industry- or commodity-specific standards *shall be complied with* based on the DHA (hazard management plan)

### 2021 Edition

- Available October, 2020
- New requirements specific to additive manufacturing



# Regulations and Standards

## 2018 International Fire Code

### CHAPTER 22

#### COMBUSTIBLE DUST-PRODUCING OPERATIONS

##### User note:

About this chapter: Chapter 22 provides requirements that seek to reduce the likelihood of dust explosions by managing the hazards of ignitable suspensions of combustible dusts associated with a variety of operations including woodworking, mining, food processing, agricultural commodity storage and handling and pharmaceutical manufacturing, among others. Ignition source control and good housekeeping practices in occupancies containing dust-producing operations are emphasized. Appropriate standards are referenced to deal with the specific dust hazards.

##### SECTION 2201 GENERAL

**2201.1 Scope.** The equipment, processes and operations involving dust explosion hazards shall comply with the provisions of this code and NFPA 652.

**2201.2 Permits.** Permits shall be required for *combustible dust*-producing operations as set forth in Section 105.6.

##### SECTION 2202 DEFINITION

**2202.1 Definition.** The following term is defined in Chapter 2: **COMBUSTIBLE DUST.**

##### SECTION 2203 PRECAUTIONS

**2203.1 Owner responsibility.** The owner or operator of a facility with operations that manufacture, process, blend, convey, repack, generate or handle potentially combustible dust or combustible particulate solids shall be responsible for compliance with the provisions of this code and NFPA 652.

**2203.2 Dust hazard analysis (DHA).** The requirements of NFPA 652 apply to all new and existing facilities and operations with combustible dust hazard. Existing facilities shall have a dust hazard analysis (DHA) completed in accordance with Section 7.1.2 of NFPA 652.

The fire code official shall be authorized to order a dust hazard analysis to occur sooner if a combustible dust hazard has been identified in a facility that has not previously performed an analysis.

**2203.3 Sources of ignition.** Smoking, the use of heating or other devices employing an open flame, or the use of spark-producing equipment is prohibited in areas where *combustible dust* is generated, stored, manufactured, processed or handled.

**2203.4 Housekeeping.** Accumulation of *combustible dust* shall be kept to a minimum in the interior of buildings. Accumulated *combustible dust* shall be collected by vacuum cleaning or other means that will not place *combustible dust* into suspension in air. Forced air or similar methods shall not be used to remove dust from surfaces.

##### SECTION 2204 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

**2204.1 Specific hazards standards.** The industry- or commodity-specific codes and standards listed in Table 2204.1 shall be complied with based on the identification and evaluation of the specific fire and deflagration hazards that exist at a facility.

TABLE 2204.1  
SPECIFIC HAZARDS STANDARDS

| STANDARD | SUBJECT   |
|----------|---|
| NFPA 61  | Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food Processing Facilities                               |
| NFPA 69  | Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems  |
| NFPA 70  | National Electrical Code  |
| NFPA 85  | Boiler and Combustion System Hazards Code   |
| NFPA 120 | Standard for Fire Prevention and Control in Coal Mines  |
| NFPA 484 | Standard for Combustible Metals   |
| NFPA 654 | Standard for Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids |
| NFPA 655 | Standard for the Prevention of Sulfur Fires and Explosions  |
| NFPA 664 | Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities                                     |



# Regulations and Standards

## International Building Code

### 2018 IBC Requirements for Occupancy Classification and Explosion Control

TABLE 307.1(1)  
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE QUANTITY PER CONTROL AREA OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS POSING A PHYSICAL HAZARD<sup>a, j, m, n, p</sup>

| MATERIAL         | CLASS | GROUP WHEN THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE QUANTITY IS EXCEEDED | STORAGE <sup>b</sup>      |                         |                       | USE-CLOSED SYSTEMS <sup>b</sup> |                         |                       | USE-OPEN SYSTEMS <sup>b</sup> |                         |
|------------------|-------|---|---------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
|                  |       |   | Solid pounds (cubic feet) | Liquid gallons (pounds) | Gas cubic feet at NTP | Solid pounds (cubic feet)       | Liquid gallons (pounds) | Gas cubic feet at NTP | Solid pounds (cubic feet)     | Liquid gallons (pounds) |
| Combustible dust | NA    | H-2   | See Note q                | NA                      | NA                    | See Note q                      | NA                      | NA                    | See Note q                    | NA                      |

Note q applies where conditions create a fire or explosion hazard

- Conditions must be evaluated, and a report submitted to the building official (§414.1.3)
  - Determine the degree of hazard and recommended safeguards, including the appropriate occupancy classification
  - DHA addresses this requirement
- Requirements for explosion control (§414.5.1) should also be evaluated in DHA

# Regulations and Standards

## Industry Feedback on Combustible Dust Regulations

### Chemical Safety Board (CSB)

- Recently issued “Dust Hazard Learning Review” [https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/6/dust\\_hazard\\_review.pdf](https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/6/dust_hazard_review.pdf)

#### Barriers to improvement

- Complacency
- Normalization of risk

#### Controls

- Lack of risk awareness
- Difficulty removing all dust
- Difficulty finding “qualified” companies / experts for dust control and explosion protection
- One-size-fits-all approach not applicable across industry or even same facility
- Cost versus perceived benefit

#### Compliance

- Inconsistent enforcement
- Mandatory directives not necessarily followed – “not worried about it”
- Where followed, often out of fear of punishment by regulators



# Dust Hazard Analysis

Let's take a quick break...

# Dust Hazard Analysis

## What is a DHA?

### Hazards

Fire

Flash Fire

Explosion

#### Material Hazards

- Develop dust sampling and test strategy
- Perform “Go/No-go” explosibility screening tests (first pass)
- Evaluate potential explosion severity and ignition sensitivity

#### Equipment Hazards

- Identify potential deflagration or explosion hazards
- Evaluate incident scenarios for credibility
- Compare existing safeguards with industry best practice
- Develop practicable, cost-effective recommendations to close gaps


#### Building Hazards

- Identify potential flash fire and explosion hazards
- Evaluate hazards
- Provide recommendations and guidelines for hazard prevention and mitigation



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Typical DHA Process



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Common DHA Methodologies

| Methodology   | Description   | Benefits  | Weaknesses   |
|---|---|---|--|
| Checklist   | Audit using checklists prepared based on prescriptive NFPA requirements.  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quick and low-cost method</li> <li>Systematic check for prescriptive compliance</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lacks detail to understand hazards and conditions</li> <li>May over-specify protection</li> </ul>                         |
| Traditional (NFPA-style)                              | Analysis and documented report prepared by qualified individual. The process is systematically evaluated against NFPA requirements.                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Documentation of the process, hazards, and gaps in protection</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requires more effort and documentation</li> <li>May over-specify protection</li> </ul>                                    |
| Engineering Analysis (often called performance-based) | <b>Systematic documented analysis, applying test data, calculations / measurements, and research to identify credible hazards and applicable recommendations.</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Thorough documentation of the process, hazards, and gaps in protection</b></li> <li><b>Protection is applied to credible hazards</b></li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Requires more effort and documentation</b></li> <li><b>More time required to complete analysis</b></li> </ul>          |
| PHA / HAZOP   | Systematic evaluation using PHA methodology (e.g., HAZOP) and team approach.  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Structured assessment with diverse team of participants</li> <li>Effective in identifying and addressing upset conditions</li> </ul>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Outcome depends on the experience of the team</li> <li>Desktop exercises may not identify hazards in the field</li> </ul> |
| Risk-based  | Qualitative or semi-quantitative risk analysis applied to one of the methods above.   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Prioritizes action items</li> <li>Identifies protection beyond NFPA standards</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Items incorrectly deemed “low risk” may not be addressed</li> <li>Acceptable risk defined by user</li> </ul>              |



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Hazard Management Compliance Options

### Prescriptive compliance

- Applicable NFPA 652 requirements
  - Preventative measures, mitigating barriers, management systems
- Commodity-specific requirements

### Performance-based option

- Evaluate design against performance goals, objectives, and criteria
- Documented performance-based design report
- **Requires Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) approval**

### Risk analysis


- Design achieves acceptable level of risk
- Documented risk analysis
- **Requires Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) approval**



# Dust Hazard Analysis


## Initial (Reactive) and Design-phase (Proactive) DHAs

Approximate Breakdown of Findings from 150 DHAs



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## DHA Example – Starch and Additive Process



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## DHA Example – Material Hazard Analysis

| Material    | Median Diameter (μm) | P <sub>max</sub> (bar) | K <sub>St</sub> (bar-m/s) | MEC (g/m <sup>3</sup> ) | MIT (°C) | LIT (°C) | MIE (mJ)  |
|-------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|----------|----------|-----------|
| Corn Starch | 16.5                 | 8.4                    | 125                       | 60                      | 300      | 400      | 300 – 500 |
| Additive    | 63                   | 8.5                    | 152                       | 45                      | 400      | Melts    | 10        |

- Both dusts are explosible, hazard class St-1 dusts
  - K<sub>St</sub> and P<sub>max</sub> similar to many organic dusts such as wood, flour, etc.
- MEC values of 60 g/m<sup>3</sup> and 45 g/m<sup>3</sup>
  - Optically thick dust cloud (e.g., can't see light through ~10 ft)
  - Plausible in equipment and in the event of large spill / dispersion event
- MIT and LIT values relatively low
- Both dusts are susceptible to ignition by various forms of sparking and electrostatic discharge



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## DHA Example – Material Hazard Analysis


### Ignition Sources

| Potential Ignition Source                                       | Energy (mJ) or Temperature (°C) | Capable of Igniting Starch Dust? | Capable of Igniting Additive Dust? |
|---|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Electrostatic discharge from a person                           | ~30 mJ                          | No                               | Yes                                |
| Electrostatic discharge from ungrounded dust handling equipment | ~1000 mJ                        | Yes                              | Yes                                |
| Electrical arcing (e.g., from energized components)             | >>1000 mJ                       | Yes                              | Yes                                |
| Surfaces of motors and lighting                                 | < 180°C                         | No                               | No                                 |
| Surfaces that feel “hot to the touch”                           | < 90°C                          | No                               | No                                 |
| Visible sparks / burning embers                                 | > 500°C                         | Yes                              | Yes                                |
| Open flame  | > 500°C                         | Yes                              | Yes                                |
| Welding slag  | > 1500°C                        | Yes                              | Yes                                |

Note: data in table is approximate and for illustrative purposes only.

# Dust Hazard Analysis

## DHA Example – Starch and Additive Process



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## DHA Example – Building Hazard Analysis



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## DHA Example – Building Hazard Analysis

How much dust is too much?

- NFPA 654 defines threshold of about 1/16 of an inch for flash fire and explosion hazard
  - Based on 1/32 of an inch threshold adjusted for starch bulk density

Combustible dust hazards

- Fire hazard
- Flash fire hazard (potential for building-wide deflagration)
- Explosion hazard

Recommendations for hazard management



- Process redesign and replacement (best long-term option)
- Control dust – seal equipment and repair dust collectors
- Restrict personnel access during pneumatic loading
- Increase inspections and housekeeping
- Install protected central vacuum system
- Class II, Division 1 and 2, Group G electrical equipment



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## DHA Example – Equipment Hazard Analysis

### Bucket Elevator



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## DHA Example – Equipment Hazard Analysis

### Hazard analysis

- Suspended dust – pneumatic conveying and bucket motion
- High-frequency, high energy ignition mechanisms
- Located indoors in building with hazardous amounts of fugitive dust
  - No protection, presents high risk for secondary explosion

### Combustible dust hazards

- Fire hazard
- Explosion hazard

### Recommendations

- Process redesign and replacement
  - Pneumatically convey directly to protected interior bin
- Monitor bearing temperature, belt alignment, and belt speed / amperage
- Install chemical explosion suppression and isolation
- Restrict personnel access during pneumatic loading






# Dust Hazard Analysis

## DHA Example – Equipment Hazard Analysis

### Additive Hopper



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## DHA Example – Equipment Hazard Analysis

### Hazard analysis

- Dust suspended during manual pouring
- Concentration may briefly exceed the MEC
- Dust is very sensitive to ignition
  - General purpose electrical equipment and electrostatic discharge may ignite dust
- The hopper is open (not confined)

### Combustible dust hazards

- Fire hazard (area around hopper)
- Flash fire hazard

### Recommendations

- Bond and ground equipment and operator
- Class II, Division 2, Group G electrical equipment (with improved housekeeping)
- Provide dust collection hood routed to protected dust collector
- Increase frequency of inspection and housekeeping
- Install close-clearance rotary valve at base of hopper
- Provide NFPA 2112 flame-resistant clothing for the worker



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Case Study – Wood Pellet Storage Facility




# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Case Study – Wood Pellet Storage Facility

- Key findings
  - Initial dust explosion led to chain of undesirable events
  - Applicable fire code did not clearly establish required protection
  - Unique process and hazards required DHA
  - Numerous deficiencies identified
    - Pellet storage protocols, detection, and suppression
    - Ignition source control
    - Explosion protection
    - Training
    - Emergency planning and response
- Key recommendations
  - Retrofit storage silos for proper detection and suppression
  - Install additional monitoring on conveying equipment
  - Redesign and protect dust collection to current industry standards
  - Implement rigorous employee training
  - Develop emergency response plan in collaboration with responding fire departments

# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Case Study – Wood Pellet Storage Facility





# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Case Study – Titanium Additive Manufacturing



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Case Study – Titanium Additive Manufacturing

- Jurisdiction concerns
  - Titanium perceived as unique, severe hazard
  - Water reactivity and appropriate suppression
  - Explosion venting
  - Electrical classification

| Property                              | Titanium Value      | Similar Material(s) |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Deflagration Index, $K_{St}$          | 60 bar-m/s          | Sawdust, paper dust |
| Maximum explosion pressure, $P_{max}$ | 6.1 bar             | Sawdust, paper dust |
| Minimum explosible concentration, MEC | 50 g/m <sup>3</sup> | Flour, cornstarch   |
| Minimum ignition energy, MIE          | 3 – 10 mJ           | Powdered sugar      |





# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Case Study – Titanium Additive Manufacturing

- Key findings
  - Primary risk associated with explosion / flash fire
    - Fire and water reactivity present far less risk
  - Argon suppression system introduced more risk than it mitigated
    - Appropriate suppression achieved by manual application of Met-L-X powder
  - Credible building explosion hazard did not exist
- Key recommendations
  - Dust control, housekeeping, and protected electrical equipment was necessary
  - Safe storage and handling of powders
  - Employee and fire department training
  - Coordinated emergency response plan




# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Case Study – Engineered Wood Fiber



# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Case Study – Engineered Wood Fiber





# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Case Study – Engineered Wood Fiber

- Key findings
  - High value process and plant was at high risk for dust explosions and flash fires
  - Low  $K_{St}$  perceived to mean “no risk”
  - Process equipment located indoors without explosion protection
  - Significant fugitive dust issue due primarily to “blow-down” approach
  - Multiple design deficiencies in existing dust collection systems
- Key recommendations
  - Immediately implement training to “recalibrate” mindset of risk presented by combustible dust
  - Install explosion protection on indoor equipment
  - Install protected central vacuum system(s) for cleaning and stop blow-downs
  - Address design deficiencies in existing dust collection systems

# Dust Hazard Analysis

## Summary of Key Takeaways

- All DHAs must provide a systematic analysis of material, building, and equipment hazards
- The individual(s) performing the DHA must be qualified
- Material hazards must be evaluated based on representative data
  - Testing typically provides the best data
  - Literature data is acceptable if used appropriately
  - Not all dust is equal, the DHA must address specific hazards
- Building and equipment hazard analysis must address all dust handling equipment and areas
  - Knowledge of the equipment and associated hazards is important
  - Where possible, field inspections should be conducted
  - Team participation provides the best insight into upset conditions
  - Details matter – many incidents involve multiple, obscure failures
- The DHA must clearly identify fire, flash fire, and explosion hazards
- Recommendations for managing hazards must be made
  - Administrative and engineering controls



# Hazard Management

Let's take a quick break...

# Hazard Management

## Hierarchy of Controls – Inherently Safer Design

### Minimization

- Use smaller quantities of hazardous material
- Perform a hazardous procedure as few times as possible

### Substitution

- Replace a substance with a less hazardous material
- Replace processing route with one that does involve hazardous material

### Moderation

- Use hazardous materials in their least hazardous form

### Simplification

- Design processes, equipment, and procedures to eliminate opportunities for errors
- Eliminate excessive use of add-on safety features and protective devices



# Hazard Management

## NFPA 652 Requirements

Wholistic approach to hazard management

- Engineering controls, administrative controls, PPE
- Prevention and mitigation

Management Systems (administrative controls, PPE) – Chapter 8

- Operating procedures and practices
- Housekeeping
- Hot work
- PPE
- Inspection, testing, and maintenance
- Training and hazard awareness
- Emergency planning and response
- Incident investigation
- Management of Change

# Hazard Management

## NFPA 652 Requirements

### Mitigation and Prevention – Chapter 9

- Building design
- Equipment design
- Ignition source control
- Dust control
- Explosion prevention / protection
- Fire protection

Focus of the following discussion is on explosion prevention / protection

# Hazard Management

## Explosion Protection Methods

### Explosion venting

- NFPA 68

### Explosion suppression

- NFPA 69, Chapter 10

### Explosion isolation

- Active isolation – NFPA 69, Chapter 11
- Passive isolation – NFPA 69, Chapter 12

### Other methods

- Oxidant reduction – NFPA 69, Chapter 7
- Combustible reduction – NFPA 69, Chapter 8
- Detection and ignition control – NFPA 69, Chapter 9
- Pressure containment – NFPA 69, Chapter 13





# Hazard Management

## Explosion Venting Overview



# Hazard Management

## Explosion Venting Equipment


Wall and roof panels



# Hazard Management

## Explosion Venting Equipment

### Vent (rupture) panels







# Hazard Management

## Explosion Venting Equipment

### Flame arresting and particulate retention devices





# Hazard Management

## Consequences of a Vented Explosion

Design must address:

- Dust collector strength
- Dust collector and process parameters
- Dust properties
- Fireball and pressure effects
- Thrust force
- Weather effects





FIGURE 6.6.2.4 Design for an Installation of a Blast Deflector Plate.



# Hazard Management

## Deflagration Suppression Overview



# Hazard Management

## Deflagration Suppression Equipment

Detectors



Suppression canisters



Control panels



# Hazard Management

## Explosion Isolation

### Active isolation

- Relies on detection and activation of device

Types of active isolation used in combustible dust applications

- Chemical isolation
- Fast-acting mechanical valve
- Actuated pinch valve
- Externally actuated float valve







# Hazard Management

## Explosion Isolation

### Chemical isolation



# Hazard Management

## Explosion Isolation

### Fast-acting mechanical valves



### Actuated pinch valves



# Hazard Management

## Explosion Isolation

### Passive isolation

- Does not require detectors or actuated

Types of active isolation used in combustible dust applications




- Passive flap valves
- Material chokes (rotary valves)



# Hazard Management

## Explosion Isolation

### Passive flap valves






# Hazard Management

## Explosion Isolation



Material chokes (rotary valves)



# Hazard Management

## Ignition Prevention (Likelihood Reduction)

### Spark Detection and Suppression






# Hazard Management

## Preventing Ember, Flame, and Smoke Transmission

### Abort Gates and Fire Shutters



# Hazard Management

## Explosion Protection Design

DHA establishes:

- Where hazards exist
- Conceptual recommendations for appropriate hazard management

Explosion protection design is typically separate phase

- Proper design equally important as other aspects of fire protection
- NFPA 68 and 69 require documented design
  - Representative dust properties
  - Equipment and process details
  - Engineering calculations
  - Analysis of explosion consequences (for venting)
- Explosion protection systems often interface with other systems
  - Fire alarm system (NFPA 72 requires monitoring)
  - Process automation systems

Acceptance testing must be performed



# Presentation Summary

# Presentation Summary

1. Dust deflagrations and explosions continue to occur in the US and worldwide
  - Hazard awareness is still growing
2. The retroactive requirement to complete a DHA is intended to address the hazard awareness gap
  - NFPA standards have aligned around fundamental DHA requirements
  - The 2018 IFC explicitly mandates a DHA for new and existing facilities / processes
3. DHAs must evaluate material hazards, building hazards, and equipment hazards
  - Hazard management can be achieved by prescriptive compliance, performance-based design, and risk analysis
4. Hazard management is a wholistic approach consisting of engineering controls and administrative controls
  - Proactive (design-phase) DHAs provide the best chance to eliminate / manage hazards
5. Preventative and mitigating measures must be engineered and appropriate for the application

# Questions and Discussion

# Thank You



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